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Abstract
Given its sound theoretical underpinnings, the RandomUtility Maximization-
based conditional logit model (CLM) serves as the principal method for ap-
plied research on industrial location decisions. Studies that implemented
this methodology, however, had to confront the underlying Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption and were unable to fully ac-
commodate this problem. This paper shows that by taking advantage of
an equivalent relation between the CLM and Poisson regression likelihood
functions one can more eﬀectively control for the potential IIA violation in
complex choice scenarios where the decision-maker confronts a large number
of spatial alternatives. The paper also provides an illustration, demonstrat-
ing the advantages of this relation in investigation of location determinants
of new manufacturing plant births in the U.S. counties.
JEL classiﬁcation: C25, R12, R39.
1 Introduction
The location of economic activity represents a logical and testable case of
ﬁrm behavior. Not surprisingly, the subject continues to spawn an enor-
mous literature, covering both theoretical and empirical research. While
many studies examine intraurban and international location decisions, most
research focuses on ﬁrm location decisions among regions.
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Indeed, from the standpoint of optimal choice theory, location is the
oldest branch of regional science. Alfred Weber and August Lösch developed
well-known interregional models of proﬁt-maximizing location emphasizing
transport costs in the early 1900s, while Edgar Hoover, Walter Isard and
Melvin Greenhut, among others, reﬁned the theory at mid-century. Over
the years location choice theory has incorporated agglomeration (spatial
externalities) along with demand conditions and factor costs. More recently,
the “new economic geography” that emerged during the early 1990s revived
old questions about location dynamics and the inﬂuence of ﬁrm site selection
decisions on economic growth and development. Agglomeration economies
and other spatial forces were recast in formal models advanced by some
of contemporary economics’ most prominent theorists and proliﬁc writers
[Krugman (1991a, 1991b), Porter (1994), Arthur (1994), Venables (1996),
Hanson (1996), Krugman (1998); for a critique see Martin (1999)].
At the same time, empirical studies seeking to identifying the factors that
underlie location decisions (markets, agglomeration economies, factor costs)
continue to proliferate. Spurring more sophisticated empirical work on lo-
cation, econometric advances have complemented the increasing availability
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of more detailed micro data sets. Increasingly, the empirical literature has
turned to model location probabilities against many spatial choices, just as
ﬁrms face when making site selection decisions. Potentially, these studies
contain important ﬁndings that can be conﬁrmed or rejected through stud-
ies in both similar and diﬀerent spatial contexts. Reliable estimates across
studies can help inform important public policy debates; for example, by
assessing the inﬂuence of local taxes compared with other regional factors.
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Given extensive analysis, the determinants of ﬁrm and plant location
decisions should be well established. We should know a lot about the rela-
tive importance of economic factors (such as factor costs and agglomeration
economies) vis-à-vis policy inﬂuences (eg. taxes and promotional policies).
But the results of the vast location empirical literature vary widely.
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More-
over, the basic questions keep getting recast in diﬀerent models. Is agglom-
eration really the dominant force in location that theory would predict? Do
labor and land costs matter? What is the real eﬃcacy of tax abatements on
location? Almost invariably, the motivation for more empirical research is
that these and other major questions remain unanswered.
Unfortunately, then, a systematic approach to empirical location mod-
eling has not been found. One reason is that the spatial scale tested in
the empirical literature extends from neighborhoods to nation states. Lo-
cation factors (wages and taxes, for example) exert distinct inﬂuences on
intraurban and international decisions. Even within interregional location
studies, however, there seems to be little commonality among the estimates.
In part, this is because various econometric approaches have been employed
(linear regression models, limited dependent models, and categorical mod-
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els). Moreover, the research often fails to take advantage of all available
information, including disaggregated data sets that capture microlevel in-
dustrial and spatial characteristics. In many cases, the econometric analysis
lacks a clear theoretical foundation—in particular, proﬁt maximizing behav-
ior.
In this connection, the most appealing approach to recent interregional
location research was pioneered by Carlton (1979, 1983), who tested the
probability that a branch plant (in one of three narrowly deﬁned industries)
would chose a metropolitan location in the United States. Carlton’s sig-
niﬁcant and lasting contributions were two-fold. First, his work was based
on a rich micro data base that focused the location decision problem on
narrowly deﬁned industries and geographic areas. Second, Carlton applied
the conditional logit model (CLM) for the ﬁrst time, opening up new possi-
bilities for applied location research. Based on McFadden’s (1974) Random
Utility Maximization framework, the paper suggested that location decision
probabilities could be modeled in a partial equilibrium setting, following
a veriﬁable economic process that results from proﬁt maximizing behavior
across spatial choices.
This paper argues that despite the advantages of the CLM, problems
arose in the aftermath of Carlton’s work. These problems hindered further
progress and reﬁnement in an otherwise promising line of research. Specif-
ically, studies that followed the conditional logit approach had to confront
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which, in a
spatial context, states that decision makers look at all locations as similar,
after controlling for the observable characteristics tested in the model. The
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assumption of independent errors is an important one, because, if violated, it
can lead to biased coeﬃcient estimates. In practice, as shown in this paper,
the empirical studies of location have been unable to fully accommodate the
IIA problem within the CLM. Also, the proposed solutions to accommodate
complex choice scenarios with the decision maker confronting many (nar-
rowly deﬁned) spatial alternatives have been unsatisfactory. More recent
studies on industrial location have tackled this later problem by applying
Poisson (count) models. Yet this direction in empirical modeling has not
been cast as part of the Random Utility Maximization framework, a main
advantage of the McFadden-Carlton approach since it links empirical work
to theory.
Here we show how one can more eﬀectively control for the potential
IIA violation in complex choice scenarios, regardless of the spatial choice
set dimension. This is done by taking advantage of an equivalence rela-
tion between the likelihood functions of the conditional logit model and the
Poisson regression (Guimarães, Figueiredo & Woodward 2002). We also
provide an empirical illustration, wherein we demonstrate how that relation
can be helpful to provide more reliable estimates for the location determi-
nants of start-up manufacturing plants in the United States counties. We
ﬁnd strong evidence that agglomeration economies (both urbanization and
localization), as well as taxes, inﬂuence location decisions. These relations
hold across all tested speciﬁcations, even when we add stringent controls
to account for omitted relevant variables. The evidence concerning other
factors (labor costs, land costs, and local markets) is not as conclusive.
The rest of the paper is comprised of four sections. The next section
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reviews previous research on industrial location decisions, pointing to per-
ceived problems with CLM and Poisson models. Section 3 proposes solu-
tions to these problems in econometric location modeling. Section 4 oﬀers
the empirical illustration, providing evidence for location factors aﬀecting
locational choices among U.S. counties. Section 5 summarizes the paper
and points to directions for further research.
2 Previous Research on Industrial Location Deci-
sions
Most recent empirically based interregional location papers have relied on
the CLM. The virtue in this line of research is a proﬁt maximizing model
linking the site selection decision to speciﬁc area characteristics. The proba-
bility of a new plant being opened at a particular site depends on the relative
level of proﬁts that can be derived in this site and hence on the site’s at-
tributes compared with those of all other alternatives. As stated in the
introduction, this approach was pioneered by Carlton (1983), who modeled
the location of new branch plants across standard metropolitan statistical
areas (SMSAs) in the United States. With the exception of Hansen (1987),
Woodward (1992), and more recently Guimarães, Figueiredo & Woodward
(2000), who also relied on narrowly deﬁned spatial choice sets, subsequent
research has modeled location choices among highly aggregated regions, such
as U.S. states [Bartik (1985), Coughlin, Terza &Arromdee (1991), Friedman,
Gerlowski & Silberman (1992), Friedman, Fung, Gerlowski & Silberman
(1996), Head, Ries & Swenson (1995), Levinson (1996), Head, Ries & Swen-
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son (1999)]. The small number of studies carried out on a narrowly deﬁned
spatial scale may be justiﬁed by the lack of available data sets (although the
information available is growing). Also, the challenge posed by modeling
large spatial choice sets within the CLM may have constituted a signiﬁ-
cant hurdle. When confronted with the large data set problem, researchers
have followed McFadden’s (1978)suggestion to work with a smaller sam-
ple of alternatives randomly drawn from the full choice set [Hansen (1987),
Woodward (1992), Friedman, Gerlowski & Silberman (1992)and Guimarães,
Figueiredo & Woodward (2000)].
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A diﬀerent approach (aggregation alter-
natives) was proposed by Bartik (1985)who justiﬁed the choice of U.S. states
as resulting from the aggregation of the true alternatives considered by ﬁrms.
However, these solutions to overcome the large data set problem are unsatis-
factory because they disregard useful information. The resulting estimators
are clearly less eﬃcient.
An econometric problem posed by the CLM in the use of narrowly de-
ﬁned spatial sets is that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
assumption is more likely to be violated. Conditional logit models rely on
the assumption that the error terms are independent across individuals and
choices. Typically, industrial location researchers have acknowledged the
potential problem caused by the existence of unobserved site characteristics
that may induce correlation across choices and therefore a violation of the
IIA assumption.
5
When dealing with small geographical units, this problem
may be more important because site characteristics that are unaccounted
for can more easily extend their inﬂuence beyond the boundaries of the con-
sidered spatial units.
6
Some researchers have attempted to control for the
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existence of unobservable correlation across choices. Two diﬀerent method-
ologies have been used. Hansen (1987), Ondrich & Wasylenko (1993) and
Guimarães, Rolfe &Woodward (1998) estimated a two-step limited informa-
tion nested logit. The diﬃculty here resides in the identiﬁcation of the upper
levels as they may constitute unrealistic scenarios for the decision-maker.
Moreover, it is sometimes diﬃcult to conceive of regional characteristics
that aﬀect upper level location choices in ways diﬀerent from the elemental
choices. Consequently, most authors [e.g. Bartik (1985), Woodward (1992),
Luker (1998), Levinson (1996) and Head, Ries & Swenson (1999)] have at-
tempted to control for the IIA violation by introducing dummy variables
for larger regions.
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Both approaches, however, and importantly, are unsat-
isfactory because they are only valid if one is willing to assume that the IIA
assumption holds within subsets of the choice set (lower level nests for the
nested logit solution and larger regions for the dummy procedure).
A recent strand of empirical research has modeled the ﬁrm location deci-
sion problem using Poisson (count) models and microlevel spatial data sets
[Papke (1991), Wu (1999), Coughlin & Segev (2000)and List (2001)]. These
Poisson studies approached the location problem diﬀerently than the CLM.
They relate the number of new plants being opened at a particular site to
a vector of area attributes. The Poisson regression is particularly advanta-
geous in dealing with large spatial choice sets. Thus, what was perceived as
a drawback in the CLMmodel becomes an advantage in the context of count
models.
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At the same time, the authors claim that extensions of the Poisson
regression model can be used to address known problems that surface when
applied to location studies. In particular, this is the case of the overdisper-
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sion problem caused by the prevalence of zeros [List (2001)] or originated
by an excessive spatial concentration of ﬁrms [Wu (1999)and Coughlin &
Segev (2000)]. Papke (1991)use a ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson regression to control
for unobserved state heterogeneity. Meanwhile, and despite these attractive
features of the Poisson regression model, it lacks a theoretical underpinning
such as the Random Utility Maximization framework for the CLM.
The link between the CLM and the Poisson regression has been addressed
in a recent paper by Guimarães, Figueiredo & Woodward (2002). Tthe
paper shows that, under some circumstances, the coeﬃcients of the Poisson
model can be given an economic interpretation compatible with the Random
Utility Maximization framework. The next section of this paper explores
this relation’s deeper implications for regional location research, positing
instruments to more eﬀectively control for the potential IIA violation in
complex choice scenarios with a large number of spatial alternatives.
3 Econometric Aspects of Location Modeling
To show the connection between the received empirical location model, we
posit a general proﬁt function for ﬁrms in a particular industry and location.
Let us start by considering an economy with K diﬀerent industrial sectors
(k = 1, ...,K). There are N investors (i = 1, ...,N) who independently select
a location j from a set of J potential locations (j = 1, ..., J). The proﬁt the
investor will derive if he selects sector k and locates at area j is assumed to
be,
π
ijk
= γ
′
x
k
+ θ
′
y
j
+ β´z
jk
+ ε
ijk
, (1)
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where γ, θ and β are vectors of unknown parameters, x
k
is a vector of sector
speciﬁc variables (e.g. entry barriers or concentration ratios), y
j
is a vector
of location speciﬁc variables (such as agglomeration economies, land costs
or local taxes), and z
jk
is a vector of explanatory variables that change
simultaneously with the region and the sector (e.g. wages or localization
economies). ε
ijk
is an identically and independently distributed random
term assumed to have an Extreme Value Type I distribution. This random
term reﬂects the idiosyncrasies speciﬁc to each investor, as well as unob-
served attributes of the choices. Based on McFadden (1974)we can show
that if investor i is proﬁt oriented then his probability of selecting location
j, conditional on his choice of sector k, equals,
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p
j/k
=
exp(θ
′
y
j
+ β
′
z
jk
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(θ
′
y
j
+ β´z
jk
)
. (2)
This expresses the familiar CLM formulation. Let us denote by n
jk
the
number of investments in region j and sector k. Then, we can estimate the
parameters of the above equation by maximizing the following log-likelihood:
logL
cl
=
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
n
jk
log p
j/k
. (3)
As shown in Guimarães, Figueiredo & Woodward (2002)the above log-
likelihood function is equivalent to that of a Poisson model which takes as
a dependent variable n
jk
and includes as explanatory variables the y
j
and
z
jk
vectors plus a set of dummy variables for each sector. That is, we will
obtain the same results if we admit that n
jk
follows a Poisson distribution
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with,
E(n
jk
) = λ
jk
= exp(α
k
+ θ´zy
j
+ β
′
z
jk
), (4)
where α
k
is a dummy taking the value 1 for sector k.
Our main interest centers on the potential problem caused by the omis-
sion of unobserved explanatory variables, which can cause a violation of
the IIA assumption. To address this problem, as indicated before, authors
such as Bartik (1985), Woodward (1992), Levinson (1996)and Head, Ries
& Swenson (1999)have included dummy variables for groups of elemental
alternatives. Within the context of the Poisson regression this amounts to
adding an additional dummy variable for each group and is equivalent to
admitting that each investor restricts his choice set to the group of alterna-
tives where the investment was observed.
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However, as stated earlier, by
doing this one is still assuming that the IIA assumption holds within the
groups of alternatives.
To more eﬀectively control for the potential violation of the IIA assump-
tion one should include an additional eﬀect speciﬁc to each alternative. This
way, we should be able to absorb all the unaccounted for factors aﬀecting
the ﬁrm location decision. In terms of our model this amounts to adding an
additional term to the proﬁt function, γ
j
, such that,
π
ijk
= γ
′
x
k
+ θ
′
y
j
+ β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
+ ε
ijk
(5)
If we assume that γ
j
is a random variable then, conditional on γ
j
, the
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probability of an investor selecting location j can be expressed as,
p
j/kγ
=
exp(θ
′
y
j
+ β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(θ
′
y
j
+ β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
. (6)
The above formulation may be interpreted as a variant of the mixed logit
model, where the attributes of the characteristics which are not explic-
itly modeled are assumed to reside in the error terms.
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On the other
hand, in light of their relation between the CLM and the Poisson regres-
sion, one can estimate the model above by means of a Poisson model with
random eﬀects.
12
If we assume that exp(γ
j
) follows an i.i.d. gamma dis-
tribution with (δ
−1
, δ
−1
) parameters and consequently that E(exp(γ
j
)) = 1
and V (exp(γ
j
)) = δ, then, as shown by Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984),
the resulting Poisson model with gamma distributed random eﬀects has
an analytically tractable log-likelihood. In the pure cross-section case, this
later model collapses to a standard negative binomial regression [Cameron
& Trivedi (1998)]. Thus, if our speciﬁcation does not include sectorial eﬀects
(i.e. z
jk
variables) one can estimate (6) by applying the negative binomial
model. More recently, there have been studies using the negative binomial
regression to model location decisions [Wu (1999)and Coughlin & Segev
(2000)] but the authors failed to note the compatibility of their approach
with the Random Utility Maximization framework.
The CLM with random eﬀects relies on the assumption that the alter-
native speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This
is a questionable assumption for dealing with the IIA problem in location
studies. Omitted factors which are supposedly accounted for by the random
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eﬀects, such as natural advantages, may be correlated with, for example,
density of economic activity.
An alternative approach is to assume that γ
j
is a ﬁxed eﬀect. This
amounts to including a dummy variable for each elemental alternative (an
alternative speciﬁc constant). In this case the dummies absorb the eﬀects
of the y
j
variables and we may write,
p
j/k
=
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
. (7)
However, in the presence of a large choice set the implementation of this
speciﬁcation is impractical because of the large number of parameters to be
estimated. On the other hand, in light of the equivalence relation between
the log-likelihoods of the CLM and the Poisson regression, the alternative
speciﬁc constant can be viewed as a ﬁxed-eﬀect in a Poisson regression.
Consequently, these eﬀects can be ”conditioned-out”and one can still ob-
tain estimates for the β vector regardless of the number of parameters (see
Appendix B).
The problem with the above approach is that we rely on sectoral variation
to estimate the model and consequently are unable to identify the impact
of variables that only exhibit intraregional variation (i.e. the y
j
vector).
The marginal impact of these variables is of particular interest in location
studies. However, as long as we have available data for diﬀerent time periods
exhibiting suﬃcient time-series variation, one can still obtain estimates for
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all parameters of interest. To see this, let
p
tj/k
=
exp(θ
′
y
tj
+ β
′
z
tjk
+ γ
j
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(θ
′
y
tj
+ β
′
z
tjk
+ γ
j
)
(8)
be the probability that the investor at time t selects location j, conditional
on his choice of sector k. Proceeding in a similar fashion as above we can
”condition-out” the local ﬁxed eﬀects and obtain estimates for the β and θ
vectors.
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4 An Empirical Application: Locational Determi-
nants of Manufacturing Plant Births Across the
U.S. Counties
4.1 Data and variables
To demonstrate ways to exploit the Poisson-CLM relation as described in
the last section, we give an illustration of ﬁrm location decisions where there
are many spatial choices. Speciﬁcally, we model the location determinants
of manufacturing plant births for the 3,066 counties belonging to the 48
contiguous U.S. states
14
. To take advantage of the relation between the
CLM and Poisson regression, the dependent variable formed for the tests
is the number of establishment births for each county by industry (2-digit
SIC code for all establishments in the manufacturing sector). We use special
U.S. Census Bureau tabulations of the Standard Statistical Establishments
List encompassing the universe of all new known openings for the years of
1989 and 1997. In Tables 1 and 2 we show the industry sector and spatial
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distributions of these new plants. As can be seen, the distributions are rela-
tively stable over time and exhibit a substantial degree of concentration. For
both years, the same ﬁve most important sectors account for approximately
57 percent of all investments. A similar pattern can be found for the spatial
distribution, as the same ten states concentrate 56 percent of new plants
births for any of the considered years.
15
.
[insert Tables 1 and 2]
The independent variables include the county characteristics that can
aﬀect the ﬁrm proﬁt function. These characteristics can aﬀect proﬁts both
from the cost and revenue side. On the cost side of the proﬁt function we test
the cost of labor, land, and capital. The county labor cost is measured by
the wage and salary earnings per job in 1988 and 1996 (LABOR COSTS).
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Since industrial and residential users compete for land, when modeling with
small areas, as in our case, land costs can be proxied by population density.
Consequently, we use population density for the years of 1988 and 1996 to
approximate land costs (LAND COSTS). Per capita property taxes for 1987
and 1997 are included in the model to account for the tax business climate in
each county (TAXES). Property taxes aﬀect all private investments made in
United States, and vary signiﬁcantly across counties. Incentives can change
eﬀective payments to local governments in some cases, but for the majority
of the new plants in our dataset the average county property tax captures
a relevant cost of doing business. To account for the revenue (demand) side
of the proﬁt function, the model needs to include a measure of market size.
As such, we use total county personal income for the years of 1988 and 1996
14
as an explanatory variable (MARKET SIZE ).
Over the years theoretical models have incorporated agglomeration or
spatial externalities along with factor costs and market dimension. Agglom-
eration includes both localization economies and urbanization economies.
Urbanization economies, i.e. externalities that are common to all ﬁrms, are
proxied by the county density of manufacturing and service establishments
per squared kilometer in 1988 and 1996 (URBANIZATION ECONOMIES ).
17
Localization economies, external economies that beneﬁt ﬁrms in the same
industry, are measured by the number of establishments in the same 2-digit
SIC industry as the investor per squared kilometer for the same years (LO-
CALIZATION ECONOMIES ).
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Additional regressors include dummy variables for the states (to account
for observable and unobservable state level characteristics) as well as a set
of dummies for each combination of year and 2-digit SIC sector to ensure
compatibility between the CLM and Poisson approaches.
4.2 Empirical Results
In Table 3 we present the results of our regression analysis. We ran several
models. The ﬁrst one, corresponding to columns 1 and 2, is a standard CLM
estimated by means of the equivalence relation with the Poisson regression.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (column 1) all variables are highly signiﬁcant and
with the expected signs. We ﬁnd evidence that the costs of production fac-
tors (labor costs, land costs and taxes) impact negatively on the probability
of location in a given county. Of all these costs, the cost of land has the
highest impact. Everything else constant, a 1 percent increase in land costs
15
leads to an 0.81 percent decrease in the number of new plant births while the
same elasticities for labor costs and taxes are -0.46 and -0.26, respectively.
19
We also ﬁnd evidence that the county market size matters and that ag-
glomeration economies (both localization and urbanization) are associated
with higher numbers of plant births. Apparently, of the two agglomeration
measures, urbanization economies have the strongest impact.
It may be argued that investment decisions are also aﬀected by state level
variables. Consequently, our results in column 1 may be substantially biased.
While it could be possible to add some observable state level variables, such
as right-to-work (open shop) legislation or state taxes, we opted instead to
control for these eﬀects by including ”state ﬁxed-eﬀects.” By doing this, we
are also controlling for unobservable state characteristics and, as argued by
some authors, mitigating the IIA problem. The results for this speciﬁcation
are presented in column 2. As expected, the increase in the log-likelihood
is statistically signiﬁcant providing evidence on the relevance of state level
characteristics. Notwithstanding, all coeﬃcient estimates remain practically
unchanged.
[insert Table 3]
As argued in section 3, to more eﬀectively control for the potential vi-
olation of the IIA assumption one should include ”county speciﬁc-eﬀects.”
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate a mixed logit model (with and without ”state
ﬁxed-eﬀects”) by means of a Poisson regression with county random eﬀects.
The results are shown in columns 3 and 4. The diﬀerence between the log-
likelihoods of the model with random eﬀects and the comparable Poisson
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regression is statistically signiﬁcant, providing evidence that the inclusion
of random county eﬀects makes sense. At the same time, as can be seen,
the results remained remarkably stable. There is no change in the sign and
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients, despite the reduction in the magnitude of the
values. However, as stated earlier, this model relies on the lack of correlation
between the county random eﬀects and the explanatory variables. Based on
Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984), one can test this hypothesis by means
of an Hausman test that evaluates the random and the ﬁxed eﬀects estima-
tors. When applied to this setting, the test provides indirect evidence on
the correlation between the random eﬀects and the explanatory variables.
The statistic equals 390.7 and thus we can not reject the null hypothesis at
the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Therefore, in a ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we use an alternative approach to deal
with the potential violation of the IIA assumption caused by the omission of
relevant variables. We estimate a CLM where we include a dummy variable
for each U.S. county. The estimation of this CLM is made by means of a
Poisson regression with ﬁxed eﬀects (see column 5, Table 3). The estimates
exhibit some noticeable changes. Agglomeration economies (both urbaniza-
tion and localization) are still signiﬁcant and with the right sign. The same
is true for property taxes. However, the evidence on the signiﬁcance of local
markets and the costs of land and labor disappears. A possible explanation
for the observed changes is that the estimates for this model are based ex-
clusively on time series variation. The time variability of our data may be
insuﬃcient to identify the importance of these variables.
In sum, when controlling for ”county speciﬁc-eﬀects” we ﬁnd strong ev-
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idence that agglomeration economies (both urbanization and localization)
are relevant factors for explaining location decisions across U.S. counties.
Apparently, urbanization economies have a higher impact. Similar evidence
about the positive impact of agglomeration economies on interregional and
interurban location was found by Carlton (1983), Bartik (1985), Hansen
(1987), Levinson (1996)and Figueiredo, Guimarães & Woodward (2002).
When controlling for ”county speciﬁc-eﬀects” we also ﬁnd strong evi-
dence that higher property taxes deter investments across U.S. counties.
Property taxes in the United States remain a controversial policy issue.
While it is often argued that local tax policy is relevant for location deci-
sions, empirical studies have failed to produce strong, consistent evidence.
The property tax was tested in various studies of location by foreign investors
[Woodward (1992), Coughlin & Segev (2000)and List (2001)] but these stud-
ies were unable to found a signiﬁcant relationship. Carlton (1983)included
local taxes in his seminal CLM location model (an interurban choice model
without ﬁxed eﬀects), but was unable to demonstrate the relevance of prop-
erty taxes.
Our results for factor costs (land and labor) are not as clear. The same is
true for local market size. While these variables are shown to be statistically
signiﬁcant in the model with random eﬀects, the same is not true for the
ﬁxed-eﬀects model. With the exception of Papke (1991)and Figueiredo,
Guimarães & Woodward (2002), previous empirical research on domestic
decisions failed to demonstrate the relevance of land costs [Bartik (1985)and
Hansen (1987)]. Evidence for the negative impact of labor costs on domestic
location decisions was found by Bartik (1985)and Figueiredo, Guimarães
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& Woodward (2002), a result not corroborated by other studies [Carlton
(1983), Hansen (1987)and Levinson (1996)]. None of the above domestic
studies tested market size.
5 Conclusion
As one of the central concerns of regional analysis, location studies require a
sound empirical and theoretical foundation. Given its microfoundation, the
CLM has been the most promising econometric approach for modeling in-
dustrial location decisions under proﬁt maximization. This CLM established
a solid methodological basis for applied location research. However, related
research on this topic has been unable to fully accommodate the problem
posed by the IIA assumption. This assumption becomes even more problem-
atic when dealing with complex choice scenarios where the decision-maker
confronts a large number of narrowly deﬁned spatial alternatives.
In this paper we show that by taking advantage of the equivalence re-
lation between the log-likelihood functions of the CLM and the Poisson
regression one can more eﬀectively control for the potential IIA violation
resulting from omitted attribute characteristics. Both the random and the
ﬁxed eﬀects versions of the Poisson regression can be used to introduce an
additional eﬀect speciﬁc to each spatial alternative. The introduction of
these speciﬁc eﬀects should absorb all the unaccounted for factors aﬀecting
the ﬁrm location decision and thus provide a control for the potential IIA
violation. Meanwhile, the implementation of the ﬁxed-eﬀects version of the
Poisson regression requires time series data exhibiting suﬃcient temporal
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variation. Fortunately, reliable micro data sets like the one obtained in this
paper to test our propositions are becoming increasingly available for longer
time periods.
As stressed in this paper, our approach to the IIA problem is compliant
with the Random Proﬁt Maximization framework. Estimating a Poisson re-
gression model with random eﬀects is equivalent to estimating a particular
case of the mixed logit model. Equivalently, the results of a Poisson re-
gression with ﬁxed-eﬀects are the same as those obtained from a CLM with
an alternative speciﬁc constant. Hence, this paper also shows that there is
a theoretical foundation for a recent branch of the location literature that
relies on the Poisson model and its extensions.
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APPENDIX A
To simplify matters, let us admit that the probability of locating in a
particular site is only a function of area characteristics (y
j
), as in Bartik
(1985), Woodward (1992)and Levinson (1996). Replacing the j index by an
index for state, s, and for county, c, we obtain,
p
sc
=
exp(α
s
+ θ
′
y
sc
)
∑
S
s=1
∑
C
s
c=1
exp(α
s
+ θ
′
y
sc
)
, (9)
where C
s
is the number of counties in state s. Thus, the log-likelihood
for the discrete choice problem is:
logL =
S
∑
s=1
C
s
∑
c=1
n
sc
log p
sc
.
If we compute the ﬁrst order condition with respect to any one of the state
”dummy variables” we get,
n
s
− n
C
s
∑
c=1
p
sc
= 0,
and thus,
exp(α
s
) =
n
s
n
∑
S
s=1
∑
C
s
c=1
exp(α
s
+ θ
′
y
sc
)
∑
C
s
c=1
exp(θ
′
y
sc
)
.
If we now plug this back into the log-likelihood function we obtain the
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following concentrated likelihood function,
logL =
S
∑
s=1
C
s
∑
c=1
n
sc
log
(
n
s
n
exp(θ
′
y
sc
)
∑
C
s
c=1
exp(θ
′
y
sc
)
)
,
logL =
S
∑
s=1
C
s
∑
c=1
n
sc
log(
n
s
n
) +
S
∑
s=1
C
s
∑
c=1
n
sc
p
c/s
. (A1)
where,
p
c/s
=
exp(β
′
z
sc
)
∑
C
s
c=1
exp(β
′
z
sc
)
.
is the probability of an investor locating in a particular county, conditional
on the chosen state. The ﬁrst term in expression (A1) is a constant. The
second term is the log-likelihood for a discrete choice problem where the
choice sets are restricted to the states where the investments were observed.
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APPENDIX B
The log-likelihood for this conditional logit problem is,
logL
cl
=
K
∑
k=1
J
∑
j=1
n
jk
log p
j/k
.
From the ﬁrst order condition for maximization with respect to one of the
ﬁxed eﬀects we obtain,
∂ logL
cl
∂γ
j
=
K
∑
k=1
[
n
jk
− p
j/k
n
k
]
= 0
Solving the ﬁrst order condition with respect to γ
j
we arrive at,
n
j
= exp(γ
j
)
K
∑
k=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
n
k
Now, if we let,
I
k
= log
(
n
k
∑
J
j=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
)
we can express the γ
j
s as,
exp(γ
j
) =
n
j
∑
K
k=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ I
k
)
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If we plug the γ
j
s back into the expression for p
j/k
, we obtain,
p
j/k
=
exp(γ
j
) exp(β
′
z
jk
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ γ
j
)
=
n
j
∑
K
k=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ I
k
)
exp(β
′
z
jt
)
∑
J
j=1
exp(α
j
+ β
′
z
jk
)
=
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ I
k
)
∑
T
t=1
exp(β
′
z
jk
+ I
k
)
,
and the concentrated log-likelihood is that of a logit model where the choices
are now the sectors with an alternative speciﬁc constant added to the model.
This log-likelihood is equivalent to that of a Poisson regression with ﬁxed-
eﬀects (see, for example, Cameron & Trivedi (1998)].
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Notes
1
The international location literature chieﬂy concerns the country-level
decisions of foreign direct investors while the intraurban/regional literature
focuses on the subnational location decisions of domestic and foreign in-
vestors. A succinct review of the foreign direct investment literature can be
found in Caves (1996).
2
Recent urban/regional incentive studies include Anderson & Wassmer
(2000) and Fisher & Peters (1999). For a useful topology of location incen-
tives and promotion policies see Bartik (1991).
3
Studies that have highlighted these conﬂicting results are, for example,
Schmenner, Huber & Cook (1987), Coughlin, Terza & Arromdee (1991),
Ondrich & Wasylenko (1993), and Coughlin & Segev (2000).
4
Note that Carlton (1983) avoided this problem by restricting the al-
ternatives to ”those SMSAs in which about 70% of all branch plant births
occurred in the industries under study”(p. 443). This restriction constrained
the number of spatial choices to 39 for SIC 3079, 24 for SIC 3662 and 26 for
SIC 3679.
5
It is also conceivable that unobserved characteristics of the choosers
30
might make some choices closer substitutes for certain investors. In this
paper we do not address this problem.
6
For that reason, one would, for example, expect two adjacent counties
to be closer substitutes than two adjacent states.
7
Usually, by including Census Divisions dummies in studies dealing with
choices across the U.S. states.
8
Note that what were choices in the CLM are now observations.
9
Note that the sector speciﬁc characteristics drop out of the next expres-
sion.
10
For example, in a state choice set analysis, introducing dummy variables
for the nine Census Divisions is equivalent to admitting that each investor
restricts his choice set to the particular Census Division where the invest-
ment was observed. The demonstration is provided in Appendix A. Note
also that, in light of this relation, introducing dummies variables for groups
of elemental alternatives is equivalent to estimating the lower levels of a
two-step limited information nested logit.
11
This model is extensively reviewed in McFadden & Train (2000).
12
See Chen & Kuo (2001)for a proof of this result.
31
13
Note that, since we now have an additional time dimension, the com-
patibility between the CLM and Poisson approaches requires the inclusion
of dummies for each combination of time period and sector.
14
A number of counties in Virginia are merged with independent cities.
This is because the data for some independent variables (those obtained
from the Regional Economic Information System database) are reported in
this manner.
15
Note also that the correlation between the spatial distribution of new
plants in 1989 and 1997 is 99,7%. The distribution of these plants by the 2-
digits SIC sectors in the two considered years also exhibit a strong correlation
(96,4%).
16
While industry-level wages would be preferable, these data present a
high number of missing values at the county level.
17
In the deﬁnition of this variable we include SICs 20 to 39 (Manufac-
turing), SICs 50 and 51 (Wholesale), SICs 52 to 59 (Retail), SICs 60 to 67
(Finance, Insurance and Real State), and SICs 70 to 89 (Services Industries).
18
All variables were introduced in logarithmic form. Wages and salary
earnings per job, personal income and population were taken from the Re-
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gional Economic Information System (REIS) database published by the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (Table CA30 and Table CA05). The number of
establishments at the 2-digit SIC level was obtained from the U.S. Bureau
of Census, County Business Patterns. The source for per capita property
tax is also the U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Government. Land area is
from the Census Geographic Coding Scheme (GICS).
19
The inclusion of time-sectorial dummies in the Poisson model imposes
the restriction that,
n
kt
=
J
∑
j=1
exp(α
kt
+ θ
′
y
jt
+ β
′
z
jkt
),
where n
kt
is the total number of investments in sector k at time t. Given
that n
jkt
= p
jkt
.n
kt
we may compute the marginal eﬀects in terms of their
impact on n
jkt
or p
jkt
. Our explanatory variables are all in logarithmic
form what means that the estimated coeﬃcients can be directly interpreted
as elasticities if we measure the impact on n
jkt
. To obtain the elasticities in
terms of p
jkt
one should multiply the estimated coeﬃcients by (1− p
jkt
).
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Table 1: Plant Births by Sector
SIC Industry Plant Births
Code 1989 1997
Number % Number %
20 Food and Kindred Products 1756 5.0 1513 5.1
21 Tobacco Products 15 0.0 15 0.1
22 Textile Mill Products 572 1.6 486 1.6
23 Apparel and Others Textile Products 3319 9.4 2704 9.1
24 Lumber and Wood Products 4058 11.5 3461 11.6
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1481 4.2 953 3.2
26 Paper and Allied Products 397 1.1 346 1.2
27 Printing and Publishing 6273 17.8 4375 14.7
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 1048 3.0 997 3.3
29 Petroleum and Coal Products 206 0.6 287 1.0
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 1360 3.8 1049 3.5
31 Leather and Leather Products 167 0.5 147 0.5
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 1400 4.0 1110 3.7
33 Primary Metal Industries 526 1.5 414 1.4
34 Fabricated Metal Products 3096 8.8 2264 7.6
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 3696 10.5 4258 14.3
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment 1845 5.2 1598 5.4
37 Transportation Equipment 1128 3.2 1193 4.0
38 Instruments and Related Products 808 2.3 802 2.7
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 2186 6.2 1849 6.2
Total 35337 100.0 29821 100.0
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Table 2: Plant Births by State
State Plant Births
1989 1997
Number % Number %
Alabama 702 2.0 544 1.8
Arizona 559 1.6 498 1.7
Arkansas 414 1.2 287 1.0
California 5680 16.1 4611 15.5
Colorado 617 1.7 557 1.9
Connecticut 424 1.2 332 1.1
Delaware 59 0.2 57 0.2
District of Columbia. 45 0.1 31 0.1
Florida 1975 5.6 1651 5.5
Georgia 1001 2.8 860 2.9
Idaho 227 0.6 202 0.7
Illinois 1328 3.8 1115 3.7
Indiana 750 2.1 598 2.0
Iowa 287 0.8 242 0.8
Kansas 278 0.8 269 0.9
Kentucky 406 1.1 339 1.1
Louisiana 425 1.2 362 1.2
Maine 211 0.6 226 0.8
Maryland 329 0.9 287 1.0
Massachusetts 716 2.0 594 2.0
Michigan 1112 3.1 1050 3.5
Minnesota 677 1.9 616 2.1
Mississippi 442 1.3 313 1.0
Missouri 670 1.9 470 1.6
Montana 185 0.5 178 0.6
Nebraska 148 0.4 116 0.4
Nevada 167 0.5 194 0.7
New Hampshire 222 0.6 203 0.7
New Jersey 999 2.8 785 2.6
New Mexico 208 0.6 173 0.6
New York 2476 7.0 2154 7.2
North Carolina 1079 3.1 865 2.9
North Dakota 60 0.2 70 0.2
Ohio 1297 3.7 1064 3.6
Oklahoma 394 1.1 348 1.2
Oregon 706 2.0 569 1.9
Pennsylvania 1333 3.8 1068 3.6
Rhode Island 221 0.6 151 0.5
South Carolina 456 1.3 439 1.5
South Dakota 101 0.3 71 0.2
Tennessee 710 2.0 561 1.9
Texas 2293 6.5 2164 7.3
Utah 277 0.8 294 1.0
Vermont 145 0.4 140 0.5
Virginia 461 1.3 449 1.5
Washington 1013 2.9 750 2.5
West Virginia 189 0.5 156 0.5
Wisconsin 789 2.2 687 2.3
Wyoming 74 0.2 61 0.2
Total 35337 100.0 29821 100.0
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Table 3: Location Determinants of Manufacturing Plants Births in the US Counties
Variables Conditional Logit Model / Poisson Regression
Without County Eﬀects With County Eﬀects
Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
Labor Costs
−0.4643
∗
[−13.818]
−0.4393
∗
[−10.938]
−0.2225
∗
[−3.047]
−0.2504
∗
[−3.336]
−0.1308
[−0.820]
Land Costs
−0.8061
∗
[−46.735]
−0.7058
∗
[−35.084]
−0.4989
∗
[−13.198]
−0.4199
∗
[−10.077]
0.2557
[1.635]
Taxes
−0.2606
∗
[−28.880]
−0.3395
∗
[−22.683]
−0.1602
∗
[−8.993]
−0.1130
∗
[−4.575]
−0.1106
∗
[−3.166]
Market Size
1.0129
∗
[227.407]
0.9266
∗
[145.482]
0.8417
∗
[52.052]
0.7496
∗
[36.949]
−0.0616
[−0.463]
Localization Economies
0.1345
∗
[52.697]
0.1283
∗
[52.494]
0.1199
∗
[57.512]
0.1192
∗
[57.126]
0.1172
∗
[57.768]
Urbanization Economies
0.5563
∗
[34.571]
0.5444
∗
[30.242]
0.2816
∗
[7.557]
0.3027
∗
[7.921]
0.2006
∗∗∗
[1.881]
State Dummies No Yes No Yes -
Log-Likelihood
−73696.38 −72543.9 −70680.7 −70472.7 −62211.92
N
obs
= J ×K × T
122520 122520 122520 122520 109560
δ (χ
2
) - -
0.1663 (6031.4) 0.1308 (4142.4)
-
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